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THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT, ONCE MORE
PAUL TAUBMAN*
In the hearings on the Revenue Act of 1971, 1 Secretary Connally
testified that it was necessary to subsidize capital in order to help
reduce existing unemployment, improve the balance of payments, and
increase capital formation in the long run.2
 Both the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee echoed Secre-
tary Connally's testimony, stating that the Revenue Act of 1971 had
five major aims: (1) to put the lagging economy on a high growth
path; (2) to increase the number of jobs and diminish high unem-
ployment; (3) to relieve the hardship imposed by inflation; (4) to
set up a rational system of tax incentives to aid in the modernization
of our production facilities; and (5) to increase our exports and im-
prove our balance of payments.'
The two major investment subsidy programs contained in the
Revenue Act of 1971 are the investment tax credit, officially called the
Job Development Credit, and the Asset Depreciation Range System
(ADR), which accelerates depreciation deductions. Without attempting
to decide whether, from a policy standpoint, the tax system is the
proper mechanism to stimulate investment in capital goods, this article
will examine the effectiveness of the investment tax credit in furthering
the goals outlined by Secretary Connally and Congress. More specifi-
cally, the article will begin with a brief examination of the history of
the investment tax credit and the provisions of the Revenue Act of
1971 pertaining to the credit. An economic analysis of the various
factors influencing investment will be offered. The operation of the
investment tax credit will be explained in light of these factors. Finally,
the effects of the investment tax credit provisions of the Revenue Act
of 1971 on stabilization, unemployment, the balance of payments and
long-run capital formation will be analyzed. 4
* Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania; Senior Research Assistant,
National Bureau of Economic Research. The author wishes to thank T. Wales, Associate
Professor of Economics, University of British Columbia, and G. Brannon, Director of
Research, Tax Analysts and Advocates, for their helpful comments.
1
 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497.
2
 Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance 92d
Cong., let Sess. 6-7, 10-13 (1971). The Act itself states that its purpose is "to provide an
incentive to modernization and growth of private industry." Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497.
House Comm. on Ways and Means, The Revenue Act of 1971, H.R. Rep. No.
92-533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1. Senate Comm. on Finance, The Revenue Act of 1971, S.
Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1.
4
 For a corresponding analysis of the Asset Depreciation Range System, see Taubman,
The Case Against ADR, 27 J. of Finance 511 (1972); Comment, The Asset Depredation
Range (ADR) System: Inequity in the Revenue Act of 1971, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
870 (1972).
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I. HISTORY
The investment tax credit was first suggested in late 1961 6 for
the purpose of increasing economic growth. Since then, the profile
of this investment subsidy has been subject to a number of cyclical
changes in policy. The credit was enacted in 1962,6 although it was
so modified from the version proposed by the administration that its
intended impact on stabilization was attenuated.' It was felt that a
tax subsidy would encourage domestic investment in capital goods
and thereby allow American producers to compete favorably with their
European counterparts who had the advantage of lower labor costs.
The ultimate result would be increased capital formation and a favor-
able balance of payments .°
In 1964 the credit was significantly liberalized by the revocation
of the Long Amendment.° Subsequently the credit was suspended for
goods ordered from October 1966 through December 1967, 10 but this
suspension was lifted early in 1967." The credit was then abolished
in April of 1969, 12 only to be reenacted in a more liberalized version
in the Revenue Act of 1971."
II. THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT PROVISIONS
Much of the debate concerning the propriety and utility of various
accelerated depreciation schemes has been clouded by the secondary
issue of whether the deferral of taxes constitutes a subsidy. However,
no such confusion exists concerning the investment tax credit because
it permits an immediate reduction in corporate income tax liability
with no offsetting increase in future taxes. The 1971 investment tax
credit permits a firm to claim, as a credit against its federal income
tax liability, a fixed percentage of the cost of "qualified investment"
purchased in that tax year." There is no increase in future taxes be-
5 See 1966 Economic Report of the President ch. 5.
0 Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 960.
7 Initially it was proposed that the credit apply only to qualified investment in
excess of some "normal" amount. Senate Comm. on Finance, Revenue Act of 1962, S. Rep.
No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1962). For discussion of the credit as enacted, see
text at notes 14-27 infra.
S Id. at 10.
9 Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub, L. No. 88-272, tit. II, § 203, 78 Stat. 33. See also text at
note 15 infra.
19 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, 80 Stat. 1514.
11 Act of Dec. 27, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-225, § 2, 81 Stat. 731.
12 Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. VII, § 703, 83 Stat. 666.
is Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. I, * 101, 85 Stat. 497.
14 int, Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 46(a), 48(a) permit a credit equal to 7% of the tax-
payer's qualified investment in depreciable property having a useful life of 3 years or more.
The useful life of the property is a measure of the amount of the credit: one-third of the
cost qualifies for the credit if the useful life is between 3 and 5 years; two-thirds of the
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cause, unlike a deduction for depreciation, the credit does not decrease
the tax basis of the depreciable property.' Qualified investment prop-
erty includes machinery and equipment" used predominantly in the
United States" and cattle." Originally the credit did not apply to most
investment produced abroad and used in the United States." How-
ever, this "buy American" provision was of interim effect only; its
demise was triggered by the 1971 Smithsonian agreement on exchange
rate revaluations."
The normal credit rate is 7% for all nonregulated industries'
and 4% for regulated utilities; 22 but a utility is precluded from claim-
ing the credit if the ratemaking body uses the credit to lower either
the cost of service to the utility or the base to which the utility's
rate of return is applied." The annual credit that can be claimed is
limited to $25,000 plus one-half of the business's federal tax liability
in excess of $25,000.24
The credit, then, is available for certain types of investment
goods and, in principle, only to firms paying income tax. However,
it is possible for railroad companies and other firms that would incur
no federal tax liability—due to loss carryovers, for example—to obtain
the tax advantages provided by the credit by leasing equipment from
other taxpayers." The profitability of such arrangements, which have
cost qualifies for the Credit if the useful life is between 5 and 7 years; and the full cost
qualifies if the useful life is 7 years or more. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, { 46(c)(2). The use-
ful life can be the one elected under the ADR provisions in the Code. Given the large
increase in the credit rate at the third, fifth and seventh years, some taxpayers may actually
elect longer useful lives. For a detailed explanation of the Investment Tax Credit, see
I S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation 452-56 (1972).
15 Act of Feb. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 203(a)(1), 78 Stat. 19, repealing §
48(g) of the Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (commonly known as
the Long Amendment), which had provided for a basis reduction equal to 7% of the
qualified investment. The present investment tax credit has no provisions for the adjust-
ment of basis, but Congress is still considering such an adjustment. Senate Comm. on
Finance, The Revenue Act of 1971, S. Rep. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1971).
10
 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 48(a) (1) (B).
17 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 48(a)(2).
18
 The credit for livestock is limited to the investment in excess of amounts realized
on sales during the six months preceding and following acquisition. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 48(a)(6).
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 48(a)(7).
28 Exec. Order No. 11666, 37 Fed. Reg. 7199 (1972). Pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 48(a) (7) (C), if the President determines that the application of § 48(a) (7) (A)
to any article or class of articles is not in the public interest he may specify that { 48(a)
(7) (A) shall not apply to such property.
21
 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(a)(1).
22
 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(c) (3)(A).
28 Mt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(e) (1) (A), (B).
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(a)(2). Any potential credit not claimed can be
carried forward 7 years or carried back 3 years. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(b)(1).
25 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 48(d)(1). For a discussion of the tax shelter aspect of
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been common in the railroad and airlines industries," may be reduced
somewhat by the Revenue Act of 1971.'
III. THE TAX CREDIT AND INVESTMENT
Having summarized the provisions of the tax law, let us turn to
two distinct but related issues: the economic consequences of the
investment tax credit and the degree to which the credit moves the
economy toward the goals enunciated by Secretary Connally and Con-
gress. The economic analysis of the credit is somewhat technical, but
the results can be summarized simply. The tax credit is significant
for two complementary reasons: first, the tax credit increases the
after-tax earnings and the rate of return on business investment;
second, the credit reduces the net price paid for qualified investment
goods.
To analyze the effects of the credit, we must determine which
factors influence the amount of investment a firm wishes to buy.
The salient feature of a basic, though not universally accepted,"
economic model of the business firm is that the firm wishes to maximize
its net worth or profits, adjusted perhaps for risk premiums." To help
understand the profit maximization argument, let us construct a very
simple model. Assume that there is a machine that never depreciates
which can be purchased for $1,000. Assume further that this machine
can, without variation, yield $100 a year in after-tax profits at an
annual percentage rate of return, denoted "r," equal to 10% of the
purchase price." If a business can raise financial capital at an after-
equipment leasing and the effect of the Revenue Act of 1971 on this area, see 1 S. Surrey,
W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation 456-58 (1972).
When the credit was abolished in 1969, the impact on railroads was deliberately re-
duced by granting a special 5-year accelerated amortization privilege on newly purchased
cars. Following the 1971 re-enactment of the credit, the railroads may receive the benefits
of the credit or the benefits of the aforementioned privilege.
28 S. Surrey, Tax Incentives—Conceptual Criteria for Identification and Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, in Tax Institute of America, Tax Incentives (1971).
27 Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(d).
28 For another economic model, see W. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations
Analysis (1965).
20
 This gloss on the factor of risk hardly does justice to the extensive analysis involved
in decision making under uncertain conditions. See, e.g., Arrow & Lind, Uncertainty and
the Evaluation of Public Investment, 60 Am. Econ. Rev. 364 (1970). However, the credit
will have only a relatively minor impact on the risk associated with any investment pro-
ject; therefore, risk will be ignored in the discussion that follows.
80
 The rate of return, r, is found by solving the following equation:
ra
Purchase Price of Investment = E [Profits,/(1 -1- Oi];
r—o
where t denotes time in years. The purchase price of an investment is the dollar cost of the
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tax interest cost, denoted "I," of less than 10% of the face amount of
the loan, the net worth of the business will be increased by investing
in the machine. Cast in other terms, it is worthwhile for the firm to
make the investment only if the present value of the future after-tax
earnings stream, discounted by i, exceeds the purchase price of the
investment; that is, if the sum over all "t" of $100/(1 +1) 8 exceeds
$1,000, where "t" denotes time in years. Of course, physical assets
do not last forever and their earnings streams fluctuate over time.
However, it is still possible to follow the same general rule, that is,
to invest if the discount value of the earnings stream exceeds the
purchase price of the asset. Within this framework, the investment
tax credit will make increased investment profitable by lowering the
effective purchase price of investment."
Another factor that will influence the amount of investment that
a firm wishes to buy is cash flow. The investment credit will increase
a firm's cash flow, i.e., after-tax profits plus the annual depreciation
deduction. It is often argued that for several reasons cash flow is
a cheaper source of financial capital than bonds or equity issues. First,
investing the cash flow allows the firm to convert ordinary income
into capital gains." Second, cash flow allows the firm to avoid what
it may consider "too high" risk premiums imposed by the financial
market. Third, the use of cash flow minimizes the possibility of loss
of control. In addition, it has been argued that cash flow is a significant
determinant of the point in time when the investment should be
made. This timing problem is important and will be discussed below."
The cash flow concept can be worked into the profit maximizing
framework. However, by focusing on the financial cost of capital,
cash flow arguments obscure an extremely important issue. Specifically,
by reducing the purchase price of capital, the investment tax credit
reduces both the total and the marginal costs of producing any output
good (including broker's fee) plus dollar cost of installation. After-tax profits are equal to
gross revenues less the sum of depreciation (zero in this case) and the cost of producing and
selling the output, in dollars. The rate of return, r, is expressed in percent terms. This
formula is the same as that used to determine the effective yield of a bond that pays a
given annual sum and sells at a given price.
81 By permitting a credit against the taxpayer's tax liability, the investment tax
credit has the indirect effect of reducing the price of the qualified machinery purchased.
This enables the business to raise financial capital at a favorable tax cost. However, if the
taxpayer has no taxable income the investment tax credit will not lower the effective
purchase price unless he can rent the equipment from a taxpaying firm. See note 25 supra,
32 This favorable tax result is accomplished by declining to distribute the cash flow
to stockholders. A distribution of the cash flow would normally be taxed as a dividend, Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 301, at ordinary income rates to the extent of the firm's earnings and
profits, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 316. Instead, the firm can expand or invest the retained
cash, which will increase the value of the stock. This increased value will be taxed at
capital gains rates when the shareholder sells his stock. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221.
88 See text at notes 40-41 infra.
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level; and the credit alters the price of qualified investment relative
to the prices of the labor, goods and services used to produce any level
of output. The reduction in production costs may lead firms to increase
their scale of operations and, generally, to increase the quantities of
each type of factor input, such as labor and raw materials, used in
producing output." Moreover, the alterations in relative prices in-
duced by the investment tax credit may cause profit maximizing firms
to substitute qualified investment for some other productive input—
provided substitution is possible." Thus substitutability is another
factor that will influence the amount of investment a firm wishes to
buy.
The substitutability of various productive inputs is, in principle,
determinable from engineering and econometric studies. Since I am
not aware of a comprehensive survey of engineering relationships, I
will concentrate on the econometric studies. Nearly all of the econo-
metric analyses of the impacts of the investment tax credit and other
subsidies to capital have focused exclusively on the substitutability
between all capital and all labor, though in a few instances capital has
been divided into plant on the one hand and machinery and equip-
ment on the other. Essentially no information is available regarding
the substitutability between qualified and non-qualified investment,
between various non-labor inputs and qualified investment, and between
diverse types of labor and qualified investments.
Also, no study exists which directly determines the change in
the profit-maximizing level of output that is due to the investment
tax credit." The existing studies do, however, give some rough idea
of the effect of the credit.
During the last decade, economists have made numerous studies
of the substitutability of capital and labor and the effects of investment
subsidies on the choice between capital and labor." Perhaps the safest
84 However, if the optimum scale of operations increased greatly, it might pay to
switch to a new production technique and eliminate certain types of production inputs
currently used by the firm.
35 However, some factor inputs may have to be increased, e.g., maintenance workers
and electricity, as the production process becomes more investment intensive.
88 In P. Taubman & R. Rasche, Subsidies, Tax Law and Real Estate Investment, in
Joint Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs
(1972), the authors study such a problem with respect to the effects of accelerated
depreciation for apartment and office buildings. In H. Aaron, Federal Housing Sub-
sidies, in Joint Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., The Economics of Federal Subsidy
Programs 571-96 (1972), the author broadens the analysis to include other assets subject to
the investment credit, but the econometric model in which he imbeds his analysis focuses on
substitution rather than change in the level of output which maximizes output.
87 Nerlove, Recent Empirical Studies of the CES and Related Production Functions,
in Theory and Empirical Analysis of Production (M. Brown ed. 1967). Jorgenson, Econo-
metric Studies of Investment Behavior, J. of Econ. Literature 1111 (1971), considers more
recent studies. It is somewhat unfortunate that those who were primarily interested in the
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generalization that can be made about these studies is that the results
differ according to the industry involved." A reasonable estimate
of the average degree of substitutability or elasticity between capital
and labor is about 0.6:" that is, if the ratio of the price of capital to
the price of labor decreases by 10%, the ratio of capital to labor used
in the production process increases by 6%. However, many studies"
use an elasticity of 1.0, which is also reasonable, rather than the 0.6.
Using the 1.0 value for elasticity, a 10% decrease in the ratio of
the price of capital to the price of labor would lead to a 10% increase
in the ratio of capital to labor used in production.
It is, of course, true that most existing capital has been molded
into particular forms that require a fixed number of workers to
operate. Thus the substitutability refers only to new investments.
Available evidence suggests that the switch to a new production process
takes longer than duplicating existing processes and that on the
average the switch to the new process is half completed in about two
years." As will be noted, the impact on unemployment and inflation
occurs earlier.
Three other matters are material to the issue of effectiveness of
the investment tax credit as a counter-cyclical force: time lag; the
relation between aggregate demand and investment; and the timing
of the investment.
IV. TIME LAG—ORDERS, PRODUCTION AND SHIPMENTS OF
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT
In terms of both the provisions of the investment tax credit and
the official accounts that measure Gross National Product (GNP),
"investment" in machinery and equipment occurs when the goods
are shipped or delivered to the purchaser." Thus investment is the
final link in the chain of order, production and shipment. The elapsed
time between an investment-influencing event, such as the investment
degree of substitution in the production function did not include information on subsidies
while those who included subsidy information used only relatively unsophisticated forins
of the production function.
as Sec note 37 supra.
3e This estimate has been used in an analysis of the effects of the tax credit. See G.
Brannon, The Effect of Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Survey of The Evidence,
in Joint Econ. Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs
(1972).
4o E
.g., Jorgenson, Econometric Studies of Investment Behavior, J. of Econ. Litera-
ture 1111 (1971).
41 Bischoff, The Effect of Alternative Lag Distributions, in Tax Incentives and Capital
Spending 61-125 (G. Fromm ed. 1971).
42 See U.S. Off. of Bus. Economics, Dep't of Commerce, National Income 27-60
0954), for a discussion of the definition of GNP. For structures and a few types of
equipment, investment is recognized concurrently with the progress of construction.
877
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
tax credit, and the resulting delivery of the investment can be as long
as twenty-five years, although in general much less than five years is
involved.
It is useful to break up the elapsed time into five stages for two
reasons: the length of several stages may be quite variable; and some
of the earlier phases will have a major impact on unemployment and
inflationary pressures. The first three stages constitute the demand
lag and the last two compose the supply or production lag.
Suppose that an investment-causing event occurs today. Before
the goods are delivered, a demand lag will occur. The lag arises from
several factors:
(a) the business must recognize that the event has occurred;
(b) it must draw up the appropriate plans and approve pro-
jects;
(c) it must place an order with a firm.
Once the order is placed, it may be filled out of existing stocks or it
may be produced anew. The production lag can be broken up into
two phases:
(d) the time spent in a backlog of prior unfilled orders;
(e) the interval during which the ordered goods are worked
upon.
The recognition lag, stage (a), can be quite long. An extreme
example demonstrates that up to twenty-five years can elapse between
the time the first and the last firms in an industry decide to use a
major technological break-through embodied in capital." Generally,
the more obvious it is that the event has occurred, the shorter the
recognition period. An investment tax credit enacted with great fan-
fare and press coverage should entail a relatively short recognition
lag.
The length of the planning and approval lag, stage (b), depends
on the complexity of the firm's organization and structure as well as
the size of the project. Some of the changes in profitability bestowed
by the investment tax credit may permit a manager, exercising his
discretion, to buy a bigger or better version of a particular machine.
However, the investment tax credit may also make a new type of
production line more profitable than an existing line. Such major
changes would probably have to go through several reviews and,
indeed, may not be acted upon until an annual capital planning session
is held. Moreover, before such changes can be planned, it is often
necessary for someone to consider current "nonstandard" alternatives.
Once projects have been approved, the goods must be ordered,
48 Mansfield, Technical Change and the Rate of Imitation, 29 Econometrics 741, 744
(1961).
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triggering stage (c). For some items the whole ordering process can
be completed in a week or two, with a firm contacting its customary
supplier. On the other hand, for big, complicated and/or nonstandard
items, lengthy negotiations with several firms may be in order. In
addition, the ordering lag will be even longer if it is necessary to
purchase a site for a new plant.
Orders for items such as office equipment, automotive products
and standard types of motors may be filled readily from stock and
in any case require extremely short production periods. But most
items have to be produced over a time interval which may vary due
to labor shortages. For example, orders for assembled machinery and
equipment are normally filled and shipped in two to three months,
while during the Korean police action the production lag was more
like two years."
Capital appropriations are often made about the time the ordering
process begins. Normally, the average lag in investment is twelve to
fifteen months after appropriations, and the average lag from the
investment-causing event, e.g. a tax credit, to shipment is about
eighteen to twenty-one months. This suggests an average demand lag
ranging from three (18 less 15) to nine (21 less 12) months; but it
must be noted that the two limits are computed from different data
sources and subject to different statistical problems:" While the
average lag is long, some effects of capital subsidies on investment are
often discernible within six months. However, those effects are rela-
tively unimportant, and if investment flows do not increase by large
amounts within nine to twelve months after subsidies first become
available it would seem that capital subsidies are not an effective way
to increase aggregate demand to counter temporary fluctuations in
unemployment. Moreover, this ineffectiveness would be exacerbated
by the fact that aggregate demand does not increase immediately when
investment occurs.
As noted earlier," increases in investment subsidies are advocated
to reduce unemployment while decreases are advocated to reduce in-
flationary pressure. Unemployment and inflation depend on the quantity
of demand that businesses perceive in the economy; but these percep-
tions are not related to current investment because of the condition
precedent of shipment within the definition of investment.'" Thus, a
44 See Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Capital Goods Review, No. 77,
March 1969.
45 For a summary of this literature, see Jorgenson, supra note 40. For the appropria-
tions results, see Almon, The Distribution Lag Between Capital Appropriations and Ex-
penditures, 33 Econometrica 178-96 (1965).
40 See text at notes 1-3 supra.
47 See text at note 42 supra.
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firm employs people to fill an order; when the good is shipped, people
are laid off. If the order is not replenished, demand will be diminished.
It may be helpful for the reader to view the problem in another way:
work in process inventories, which enter into computation of the GNP,
are increased as the investment good is built; when the good is shipped,
these inventories are reduced by the total value of the shipment. In
more general terms, inflationary pressures depend on the orders back-
log while employment depends on the number of machines currently
being produced. The total time spent in producing and shipping goods
will exceed the time lapsed before aggregate demand is influenced.
V. WHEN INVESTMENTS SHOULD BE MADE
The timing of investments is another factor which influences the
counter-cyclical effectiveness of the investment tax credit. Investment
is the gross addition to capital stock. Often economic analysis can be
used to determine how much the capital stock will be likely to change
in response to a new government policy or other events. If the analysis
spans several of the aforementioned periods, there is the additional
problem of ascertaining when the firm should make its investment to
increase the capital stock. The current view is that business investment
is depressed when the capital stock is operating well below full capacity
rates, even if capacity utilization is increasing." This fact raises two
interrelated questions: first, whether the investment-capacity utiliza-
tion behavior is consistent with the assumed profit-maximizing be-
havior; and second, whether excess capacity destroys the normal
incentives supplied by the investment credit."
The basic explanation of excess capacity is that a firm will not
be able to sell or immediately stop renting particular types of capital
when sales or relative prices become unfavorable. Thus, even after
sales partially recover, the amount of capital on hand would still
exceed the amount of capital needed by the firm. Since total invest-
ments are merely reduced and not completely eliminated during
recessions, the prior argument implies that, cyclically, there will be less
excess capacity for some types of capital than others. In this situation,
the investment tax credit could increase the cyclical disparity by
making the optimum level of capital greater than the actual for items
48 Chenery, Overcapacity and the Acceleration Principle, 20 Econometrica 1 (1952).
Full capacity can be thought of as the total amount of output that the firm can produce
continuously, given its capital stock. Capacity utilization is the ratio of actual capacity to
full capacity. Under this definition, there is excess capacity when capacity utilization is less
then 100%. (The latter figure may be modified to 95% in order to account for servicing
and repairs of machines.)
49 R. Eisner & R. Strotz, Determinants of Business Investment, in Impacts of
Monetary Policy 59-337 (1963).
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(	 Profits,	 )	 [ (Purchase Price, + 1 ) (	
Purchase Price,	 Purchase Price, 	 1 -I- Cost of Financial Capital
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that were almost in balance prior to enactment of the investment
tax credit.
There is, however, one additional aspect to the problem. Suppose
a firm wishes to increase its capital by one machine. Assume that the
firm can buy the machine now or purchase it in a year. Such purchases
(of the same machine at two different dates) involve mutually exclu-
sive investments. To choose between such mutually exclusive invest-
ments, profit-maximizing behavior requires a different rule than mere
comparison of the present discounted value of future returns with
the net purchase price. The correct decision is to select that invest-
ment whose present value exceeds the purchase price by the largest
amount." If the purchase prices are expected to be the same in both
where it is assumed that profits beginning in years c and t +.7 will be the same, regardless
of the date when the machine is purchased. This formula Is derived from that in note 30
supra. One way to express the latter formula is in terms of the discounted value of after-tax
profits and the purchase price of capital. Thus, we can formulate a strategy to invest if:
	
Profits, +1	 Profits, +11(1) 0 < [Profits, + 	





where the year N is so far in the future that the last term in the parentheses is close to
zero. Suppose that the identical machine, purchased a year from now, will generate the
same revenue from year one on as the machine purchased now. If the machine were to be
purchased within a year, current profits would be zero and the equivalent form of equation
(1), would be:
Profits, + ,	 Profits t 4-N 1(2) 0 < [Profits, +„ 	 + 	 (Purchase Price, + ,)
(I + 1)	 (1 + i)14-N-1
However, since any profits and expenditures will be made a year from now we must
1
multiply all items by 	 . After this multiplication, we can determine whether the
(1 + i)
current or future investment is the more profitable expenditure now by comparing (ad-
justed) equation (2) with equation (1) and choosing the equation with the larger right
hand side. Doing so, we find that equation (1), current investment, is the more profitable
if:
[, Purchase Price, 4.,
(3) Profits, — Purchase Price, + 	
 > 01 + i
The formula given at the beginning of the footnote is obtained by dividing all terms in
equation (3) by the Purchase Prices and rearranging the order of terms.
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periods, the machine should be purchased the next year if the first
(	 Profits:	)
year profit rate, 	  ,	 1is less than 1	 (	  orPurchase Prices	1 i
	  . Effectively, this means that a firm should delay purchase of
\
the capital unless the profit rate in the first year exceeds the cost of
financial capital that year. When there is excess capacity, the first
year revenues obtained from a new machine may be close to zero,
especially since currently idle yet efficient capital can be used to fill any
unexpected increase in demand. But if the first year profits are zero,
the necessary inequality will never obtain, given positive interest rates.
In other words, if idle capital is nearly as efficient as the proposed new
investments, it pays for the firm to delay building up its capital stock.
The above economic analysis is admittedly complicated; it has
been included to aid in understanding the difference between permanent
and temporary subsidies. Suppose that a credit is to be given only for
investments shipped within a year from now. Then the net purchase
price of the mutually exclusive investments will be more expensive
a year from now and the necessary inequality" is more likely to
obtain. Indeed, it is always possible to induce a firm to buy now
rather than later by making the temporary credit sufficiently large.
That is, the net purchase price in the first year can be reduced by a
( Purchase Pricet44	 ( 1
sufficiently large tax credit so that 	
Purchase Prices	\ 1 + i
> 1. Moreover, a temporary investment credit will always have as
great an impact on current investment as a permanent credit of the
same amount if the goods can be ordered and shipped within a year.
VI. THE STABILIZING EFFECTS OF THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1971
The newly enacted investment tax credit will increase business
demand for machinery and equipment. However, its usefulness as an
instrument for stabilization depends on how much additional invest-
ment and other aggregate demand it induces in the near future. Ac-
cording to the formula used by the Treasury Department, the 7%
credit would reduce the net price of qualified capital by 10%.52 This
51 See the inequality set out in note SO supra.
52 The Treasury figures are taken from Secretary Connally's statement before the
Senate Finance Committee, Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1971 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings]. As
I explain below, the formula is incorrect but the 10% change due to the credit is probably
not too sensitive to alterations in the formula.
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particular figure, however, overstates the effect of the tax law for
total business investment because of the annual limitations on amount
claimed," because of the lower rates provided utilities and shorter-
lived assets," and because structures, inventories, and other invest-
ments are not "qualified!'" Assuming that other factors remain con-
stant, a 10% reduction in the price of qualified capital would lead to
an approximate increase of from 6% to 10% in the desired stock of
capital—perhaps $5 billion in added investment over a period of
several years." All other things, however, will not be constant. As
currently unemployed workers are hired, output and disposable in-
come will increase. The increase in output will lead to further invest-
ment demand and the increase in disposable income will agument the
demand for consumption goods. Of course, these new demands will
lead to another increase in employment and output. This so-called
"multiplier-accelerator" process implies that, over a given period,
each initial dollar increase in investment will induce an increase in
GNP or aggregate demand of more than one dollar."
There is as yet no general consensus regarding either the size
of the "multipliers" to be applied to the investment increase (initially
due to the tax credit) or the timing in the increase in investment
demand. The Wharton Economic Forecasting Model (Wharton Model)
presents estimates of the effect of the tax credit on investment, un-
employment, and consumer prices from two widely known and used
models." This model indicates the impact of the tax credit in each
of the first eight quarters and an average impact for the first and
second years. According to the Wharton Model, investment will be
unchanged in the quarter that the credit is granted, investment will
increase by $0.1 billion in the next quarter, and investment will rise
gradually to $1.0 billion after eight quarters. The average increase
is $0.2 billion and $0.7 billion for the first and second years respec-
tively. Because of the multiplier effects, real GNP rises about twice
as much as investment, $0.4 billion and $1.3 billion in the first and
second years, but inflation and unemployment are barely changed.
58 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(a) (2).
54 Ind. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(c) (3) (utilities), § 46(c) (2) (shorter-lived assets).
55 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 48.
66 This figure may overstate the amount of investment that will have to be undertaken
over the next several years because of the existence of excess capacity.
87 The change in GNP divided by the change in investment is called the "multiplier."
An increase in aggregate demand will be subject to the multiplier process, though there
may be different multipliers for different tax and subsidy changes. Note that the multiplier
can incorporate the increase in (work in process) inventories prior to the shipment of the
machinery and thus allow for the additional impacts of the increased after-tax profits on
dividends (and consumption) and business demand for loans.
58 The Wharton Model is presented in the following table:
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For example, the .07% decrease in unemployment rate represents a
change from 5.17% to 5.1%.
A different model, the Data Resources Model," indicates prac-
tically no effect on investment in the first year, but after five quarters
investment spurts and winds up $2.9 billion higher for the second year.
Because of the pattern of investment, real GNP and the other variables
are virtually unchanged in the first year. Since the multiplier for the
TABLE 1: EFFECT OF INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT ON VARIOUS MAGNITUDES
Wharton Economic Forecasting Modela
Real Non-
Residential	 Consumer	 Unemploy-
Quarter after	 Fixed	 Price	 ment
Tax Credit	 Real GNP	 Investment	 Index	 Rate
imposed	 Bill $	 Bill $	 Points	 To
0 0 0 0 0
1 .2 .1 .1 -.01
2 .6 .3 0 -.02
3 .9 .4 .1 -.04
4 12 .5 0 -.05
5 12 .7 .1 -.06
6 1.4 .7 .1 -.07
7 14 1.0 0 -.08
First year .4 .2 .05 -.02
Second year 1.3 .7 .05 -.07
a Based on calculations supplied by WEFA.
55 The Data Resources Model is presented in the following table:




Quarter after	 Fixed	 Price	 ment
Tax Credit	 Real GM'	 Investment	 Index	 Rate
Imposed	 Bill $	 Bill $	 Points	 %
0 o 0 o 0
1 0 0 0 0
2 0.1 0 0 0
3 0.2 .1 0 0
4 0.8 .7 0 0
s 2.0 1.8 0 0
6 3.8 3.5 0 -.1
7 6.2 5.7 0 -.2
First year .1 0 0 0
Second year 3.2 2.9 0 -.1
° R. Gordon and D. Jorgenson, "Investment Incentives in the 1971 Tax Bill," dated
Dec. 1971.
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first few periods is smaller in this model, the increase in real GNP
in the second year is only slightly greater than the gain in investment.
Prices remain unchanged, while the unemployment rate declines by
.1% in the second year.
Readers may find these differences in the results projected by
the two models, especially those of the second year, disturbing.
Economists are also disturbed, but at this writing even the few
available unbiased economists cannot say which is the better analysis.
Despite the differences, the results from each model suggest that
the permanent investment tax credit would have very little stabilizing
value during its first year and only a small impact on unemployment
and inflation in the second year. Other policies, such as a temporary
tax credit or an increase in government expenditures, portend more
immediate impact. However, a temporary tax credit was rejected by
Congress," and government expenditures were reduced to help balance
the revenue lost by the investment tax credit. Thus I conclude that,
in the short run, employment was not increased and in fact may have
been reduced by the combined package, assuming government expendi-
tures were reduced. The tax credit was thus a failure as a stabilizer in
the 1971-72 period.
Events since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1971 support
this conclusion. Orders for machine tools did not begin to rise strongly
until March 1972, and investment in machinery and equipment rose
only by 8% in real terms between August 1971 and August 1972.81
This growth rate in investment falls far short of the 12% in the boom
period of 1955 or 1966. Yet investment should have benefited from
the asset depreciation range system, from a more rapid rate of growth
in the economy, and from a devaluation of the dollar as well as from
the investment tax credit."
VII. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS
The provisions for investment tax credit, as originally conceived
in the Revenue Act of 1971, could have directly affected the balance
of payments situation in three ways. First, the provisions could have
encouraged the purchase of domestically produced investment goods,
since they restricted the credit to goods for which more than 50% in
basis was attributable to value added in the United States. However,
this "buy American" provision was dropped late in 1971." Second,
(Jo A temporary credit was advanced in the Administration's original proposal and
was advocated by Secretary Connally. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 5.
ei See the statistical appendix to 1973 Economic Report of the President.
02 See generally Brannon, supra note 39.
63 See note 20 supra.
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the investment subsidy lowers production costs and accordingly could
allow American firms to lower prices of goods that compete with foreign-
made goods. Third, the investment subsidy could increase the rate of
return on direct domestic investment as compared with its foreign
counterpart. In principle, each of these effects should occur, but of
course the important question is how strong each effect will be.
Since the "buy American" provision has been eliminated, it cannot
affect the balance of payments situation now, although it could have
had an impact through the first quarter of 1972. But it is of interest
to ascertain with its impact would have been, had it remained in effect.
The United States exports $9 billion of non-automotive machinery
and equipment, while the corresponding imports are $3 billion to
$4 billion. The tax credit would have encouraged the substitution of
domestically produced equipment for close substitutes produced abroad.
While economists have tried to estimate import demand functions for
machinery and equipment, the attempts have not been very successful."
There are, however, good reasons for suspecting that the impact
of the credit on substitution of domestic-produced for foreign-produced
investments would have been more modest than anticipated. First,
foreign-produced goods, rather than having been priced at cost, may
have been priced in the United States just low enough to divert Amer-
ican business. 85 Accordingly foreign producers may be able to lower
their prices further to offset the investment tax credit and still make a
profit. While such price reductions would help our balance of pay-
ments, the quantitative effect would be much smaller than transferring
the whole purchase price to an American producer. Moreover, the sub-
stitution argument assumes that "all else" is constant, which might not
be the case. If the policy were successful, foreign machinery makers
might complain that a discriminatory practice of the United States had
harmed them; a request for retaliatory action under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade might be expected." Since the United States
exports more machinery than it imports, the net effect of a countervail-
ing tax credit by foreign countries would probably impair still further
84 E. Spitaller, The 1961 Revaluations and Exports of Manufacturers, Int'l Monetary
Fund Staff Papers 110-26, March 1970.
48 This could not be the case in the perfectly competitive world, but the foreign
machinery industry is not a perfectly competitive world.
66
 61 Stat. AS (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 11.N.T.S. (effective Jan. 1, 1948), arts.
XXIII and XXVIII permit a Contracting Party to retaliate against another Contracting
Party when a tariff benefit is being nullified or impaired. In addition, Article VI, § 3 allows
a Contracting Party to levy a countervailing duty "for the purpose of offsetting any
bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or
export of any merchandise." It seems that the investment tax credit runs the danger of
both methods of retaliation.
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the United States' balance of payments. While the investment tax credit
can aid the balance of payments by lowering the price of an input
factor, thereby lowering the cost of production, the lower input prices
apply only to new investments that will be acquired over a period of
several years. It is doubtful, then, that the credit can be a particularly
powerful stimulus to the balance of payments in the short run.
Firms decide to build or buy plants in the United States or
abroad partly on the basis of the comparative after-tax rate of return
on investments. Once again, a fairly long decision lag should be ex-
pected on major expenditures plans. Evidence suggests that a 10%
increase in the rate of return would reduce American investments
abroad by 15%." This estimate seems too large because the 10%
applies only to qualified investment." The Treasury has argued that
foreign countries give greater subsidies to capital than does the United
States. For reasons that I shall explain below, I doubt that this argu-
ment is correct, but I admit that if it is true, the credit might be
advocated as necessary to offset foreign inducements to direct invest-
ment.
The discussion in this section indicates that the short-run effects
of the credit on the balance of payments will probably be minimal,
especially in comparison with the effects of the Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Corporation provisions in the Revenue Act of 1971 00
 and
the devaluation of the dollar. With such weak effects it is difficult
to defend, on balance of payments grounds, a policy which gives sub-
sidies to firms whether they export or not.
VIII. ECONOMIC GROWTH
The investment tax credit can increase output and consumption
by creating a demand for currently unemployed resources. In the long
run, however, resources tend to be used either fully or at a fixed rate,
and accordingly this demand appears to be of minimal importance.
Even with full employment, consumption per person—the economic
definition of growth—can be accelerated if physical investments are
accumulated more rapidly. 7° As already explained, the investment
07 S. Kwak, A Model of Direct U.S. Foreign Investments, 1969 (Brookings Institution
mimeograph) ; J. Popkin, Interfirm Differences in Direct Investment Behavior of U.S.
Manufacturers, 1955 (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Pennsylvania).
OS Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46(a).
00
 Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 501-03, 85 Stat. 497, amending Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, H 992-93.
7° I assume a definition of consumption which includes the value of the quality of life
and which does not count costs arising from pollution as consumption. This definition does
not correspond to the GNP accounts on which the empirical estimates are based.
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credit would increase business's desired amount of capital, assuming
all else remains the same, by lowering the price of capital. This logic
has led commentators and the Treasury Department to conclude that
the investment credit would increase growth at full employment 7 11
Indeed, Secretary Connally's testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee relied heavily on the following type of reasoning. Foreign
countries give greater subsidies to capital than does the United States."
Foreign countries, therefore, will accumulate more capital and will
have an advantage in international trade. Thus the United States
should increase its subsidies to capital.
There are, however, at least three flaws in this reasoning. First,
the formula used by Secretary Connally in arriving at his conclusion
that foreign governments give greater subsidies is incomplete and
almost surely overstates the extent of foreign subsidies to capital."
Second, according to the balance of payments argument, if other
countries give subsidies and distort relative prices in their economy,
the proper response of the United States is to distort its economy.
Conversations with specialists in international trade have indicated
that this particular problem has not been studied, but that they doubt—
as do I—that this conclusion is correct. The third flaw in the argu-
ment is that it is not necessarily true that subsidies that lower the
price of capital will lead to more capital being accumulated.'" The
earlier arguments regarding such effects as short-run stabilization all
assumed that there were unemployed resources that could be used
and that all market prices remained fixed after the subsidy was
granted. However, in a fully employed economy the extra investments
can only be obtained by reducing or bidding away resources devoted
to other areas.
The following is a useful way to picture the long-run adjustment
process to the granting of the investment tax credit. Assume that the
government does not reduce its expenditures but raises income taxes.
The investment tax credit increases the demand for qualified invest-
ment at given prices, including interest rates. The increased orders
for investment goods and financial capital lead to higher interest rates
and prices for investment goods. The higher prices in turn cause cur-
11 See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 6-7.
72 Id. at 8.
18 For example, the Treasury did not include various taxes on net worth, especially
those levied by the non-central government, which are substantial in Germany and else-
where. For other problems see my testimony before the Senate Finance Committee. Id. at
743. Conversations since then have indicated that the situation is more complex than indi-
cated in my testimony and, in particular, that some points I raised there may be incorrect.
14 The following argument ignores the possibility that the subsidy will divert the
direct investment abroad back to the United States.
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rent producers of consumer goods and nonqualified goods, such as
housing, to switch into the production of qualified investment. Thus,
if there is no increase in saving and in the aggregate amount of in-
vestment, the tax credit would cause only a readjustment of prices
and interest rates to reallocate given savings. Of course, saving may
be stimulated by the increase in the interest rate but the (admittedly
weak) evidence that is available would suggest that interest rates
have only a small effect on saving. Also, the investment tax credit,
combined with a proportional increase in the personal income tax
schedule, will cause the share of after-tax earnings that go to the
wealthy and to the owners of businesses to increase. This redistribu-
tion probably will increase savings.
The effects of a 10% investment tax credit have been estimated"
using a growth model assuming either that each 10% increase in the
interest rate raised saving by 1%, or that the wealthy save ten times
more of their income at the margin than do the poor. 76
 In the first
instance, per capita consumption rose 0.3 % and the interest rate
11.4% in response to the credit.77 In the second—assuming that capi-
talists save at the margin ten times as much as do wage earners—the
10% tax credit would raise per capita consumption 1% and the in-
terest rate 81,LA %. Both of these examples indicate that the credit
can modestly increase investment and consumption in the long run;
and a usual justification for the tax credit is that the tax benefit
granted to the rich will trickle down to everyone in the society. Yet
it would appear that in the long run the consumption of workers
would decline by 0.5% in the first instance and increase by 0.25% in
the second case.78 In other words, the trickle would be small or non-
existent.
SUMMARY
This article began by enumerating the goals that the investment
tax credit was supposed to fulfill. The analysis in the article indicates
that a permanent credit will not be very effective for short-run stabiliza-
tion or for improvements in the balance of payments. In fact, in 1971
the credit may have had perverse stabilization impact because of the
associated decrease in government expenditures. The investment tax
75 Taubman & Wales, The Impact of Investment Subsidies in a Neoclassical Growth
Model, 51 Rev. of Econ. & Statistics 287 (1969).
75 Thus a 7% credit would have about 70% effectiveness.
77 If saving is twice as responsive to interest rate changes, per capita consumption
would rise 6%.
78 Taubman & Wales, supra note 75, at 291, 295.
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credit will influence long-run growth, but only modestly and with little
or none of the benefits trickling down to the poor. Thus, in a broad
sense, on grounds of economic efficiency the policy must be judged
a failure. Of course, economic policy can also be used to correct or
change income distribution. Thus the ultimate defense of the invest-
ment tax credit must rest on the proposition that businesses and their
owners are taxed too heavily as compared to wage earners and the poor.
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